37 results
Prediction of impending mood episode recurrence using real-time digital phenotypes in major depression and bipolar disorders in South Korea: a prospective nationwide cohort study
- Heon-Jeong Lee, Chul-Hyun Cho, Taek Lee, Jaegwon Jeong, Ji Won Yeom, Sojeong Kim, Sehyun Jeon, Ju Yeon Seo, Eunsoo Moon, Ji Hyun Baek, Dong Yeon Park, Se Joo Kim, Tae Hyon Ha, Boseok Cha, Hee-Ju Kang, Yong-Min Ahn, Yujin Lee, Jung-Been Lee, Leen Kim
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- Journal:
- Psychological Medicine / Volume 53 / Issue 12 / September 2023
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 23 September 2022, pp. 5636-5644
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Background
Mood disorders require consistent management of symptoms to prevent recurrences of mood episodes. Circadian rhythm (CR) disruption is a key symptom of mood disorders to be proactively managed to prevent mood episode recurrences. This study aims to predict impending mood episodes recurrences using digital phenotypes related to CR obtained from wearable devices and smartphones.
MethodsThe study is a multicenter, nationwide, prospective, observational study with major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder I, and bipolar II disorder. A total of 495 patients were recruited from eight hospitals in South Korea. Patients were followed up for an average of 279.7 days (a total sample of 75 506 days) with wearable devices and smartphones and with clinical interviews conducted every 3 months. Algorithms predicting impending mood episodes were developed with machine learning. Algorithm-predicted mood episodes were then compared to those identified through face-to-face clinical interviews incorporating ecological momentary assessments of daily mood and energy.
ResultsTwo hundred seventy mood episodes recurred in 135 subjects during the follow-up period. The prediction accuracies for impending major depressive episodes, manic episodes, and hypomanic episodes for the next 3 days were 90.1, 92.6, and 93.0%, with the area under the curve values of 0.937, 0.957, and 0.963, respectively.
ConclusionsWe predicted the onset of mood episode recurrences exclusively using digital phenotypes. Specifically, phenotypes indicating CR misalignment contributed the most to the prediction of episodes recurrences. Our findings suggest that monitoring of CR using digital devices can be useful in preventing and treating mood disorders.
The Mind–Body Problem after Fifty Years
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- By Jaegwon Kim
- Edited by Anthony O'Hear, University of Buckingham
- Foreword by Tim Crane, Central European University, Budapest
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- Book:
- The Philosophy of Mind
- Published online:
- 19 May 2022
- Print publication:
- 09 June 2022, pp 3-33
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Summary
It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein’s well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, focused on the logic of mental discourse rather than the metaphysical issue of how our mentality is related to our bodily nature. In fact, Ryle and Wittgenstein would have regarded, each for different reasons, the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation as arising out of deplorable linguistic confusions and not amenable to intelligible discussion. There was C. D. Broad’s earlier and much neglected classic, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, which appeared in 1925, but this work, although robustly metaphysical, failed to connect with, and shape, the mind–body debate in the second half of this century. It is fair to say that the mind–body problem as we know it today had its proximate origins in a trio of papers published in the late 1950s: U. T. Place’s ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, in 1956, and J. J. C. Smart’s ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ and Herbert Feigl’s ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’, published in 1958 and 1959 respectively. In these papers, Place, Smart and Feigl proposed an approach to the status of mind that has been variously called ‘the mind–body identity theory’, ‘central-state materialism’, ‘type physicalism’, and ‘the brain-state theory’. In particular, it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that had a major philosophical impact, launching the debate that has continued to this day.
Possible Worlds and Annstrong's Combinatorialism
- Jaegwon Kim
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- Journal:
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 16 / Issue 4 / December 1986
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 01 January 2020, pp. 595-612
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At the outset of his instructive and thought-provoking paper, ‘The Nature of Possibility,’ Professor David Armstrong gives a succinct description, in itself almost complete, of his ‘combinatorial theory’ of possibility. He says: ‘Such a view traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations - allthe combinations which respect certain simple form- of given, actual elements’ (575). We can perhaps start a bit further back than this. In explaining the idea of a ‘possible world,’ some philosophers begin with the idea of ‘things being a certain way’ or ‘the way things are.’ From this idea a leap is made to ‘things might have been a certain other way’ or ‘ways things could have been.’ And here we already have possible worlds, or so some philosophers assure us: David Lewis, for example, says his talk of possible worlds is nothing but a ‘permissible paraphrase’ of this familiar and innocent-sounding locution, ‘ways things could have been.'
Contributors
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- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
- Published online:
- 05 August 2015
- Print publication:
- 27 April 2015, pp ix-xxx
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Contributors
- Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
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- New Perspectives on Type Identity
- Published online:
- 05 April 2012
- Print publication:
- 08 March 2012, pp ix-ix
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Chapter 8 - The very idea of token physicalism
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- By Jaegwon Kim
- Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
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- New Perspectives on Type Identity
- Published online:
- 05 April 2012
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- 08 March 2012, pp 167-185
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Summary
This chapter discusses the groundwork for an account of acquaintance and the consequences of the account for the metaphysics of mind. Acquaintance is a unique epistemological relation that relates a person to her own phenomenally conscious states and processes directly, incorrigibly, and in a way that seems to reveal their essence. Such an epistemic relation has struck many philosophers as deeply mysterious. The chapter dispels some of this mystery by providing an account of direct phenomenal concepts. These are the concepts deployed when a person is acquainted with her own conscious states in introspection. Consciousness appears puzzling for many reasons, not just because of the conceivability of zombies. The chapter shows that phenomenal concepts are analogous to quotation expressions and explaining how certain conceptual roles can make an operation mental quotation.
4 - Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
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- By Jaegwon Kim, William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy, Brown University
- Edited by Kirk Ludwig, University of Florida
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- Donald Davidson
- Published online:
- 02 December 2009
- Print publication:
- 21 July 2003, pp 113-136
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Summary
Donald Davidson's work on the nature of the mind has had a major impact on contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind; it is fair to say that no other philosopher has been more influential in shaping the basic contours of the field as it exists today. As is true in the case of many other philosophers, both of his generation and of following generations, his reflections on mind and its relation to matter have been carried on with a set of broad physicalist assumptions as a backdrop. Precisely what these assumptions are is not easy to say, and it is not necessary to set them down in exact formulations. For most philosophers who have reflected on the status of mind, including Davidson, the main task has been that of finding for mind a place in an essentially physical world. The world is fundamentally a physical world in that the space-time world is the entire world, and that within space-time we find nothing but bits of matter and increasingly complex aggregates made up of bits of matter. As C. Lloyd Morgan, one of the early emergentists, aptly put it, there is “no insertion of alien forces” (Morgan 1923) when complex physical systems are generated out of simpler ones; there are only material elements arranged in new relationships and structures. These material entities have various physical properties – mass, motion, energy, electric charge, temperature, elasticity, and the like – and they behave in accordance with the laws of physics.
13 - Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body Problems for the Physicalist
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- By Jaegwon Kim
- Edited by Carl Gillett, Illinois Wesleyan University, Barry Loewer, Rutgers University, New Jersey
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- Book:
- Physicalism and its Discontents
- Published online:
- 02 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 26 November 2001, pp 271-283
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Summary
Mental Causation and Consciousness
Schopenhauer famously called the mind-body problem a “world-knot,” or “Weltknoten,” and he was surely right. However, the mind-body problem is not really a single problem; it is a cluster of connected problems about the relationship between mind and matter. What these problems are depends, of course, on a broader framework of philosophical and scientific assumptions and presumptions in which the questions are posed and potential solutions are formulated. For the contemporary physicalist, I believe that there are two problems that truly make the mind-body problem a Weltknoten, an intractable and perhaps ultimately insoluble puzzle. These problems concern mental causation and consciousness. The problem of mental causation is to answer this question: How can the mind exert its causal powers in a world that is fundamentally material? The second problem, that of consciousness, is to answer the following question: How can there be such a thing as a mind, or consciousness, in a material world? Moreover, as I will argue, the two problems are interconnected – the two knots are intertwined, and this makes it all the more difficult to unsnarl either of them.
Giving an account of mental causation has been, for the past three decades, one of the main preoccupations of philosophers of mind who are committed to physicalism in one form or another. The problem, of course, is not new: As every student of western philosophy knows, Descartes, who arguably invented the mind-body problem, was confronted forcefully by his contemporaries on this issue. But this does not mean that Descartes's problem is our problem.
The Mind–Body Problem After Fifty Years
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- By Jaegwon Kim
- Anthony O'Hear, University of Bradford
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- Book:
- Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind
- Published online:
- 12 May 2010
- Print publication:
- 13 November 1998, pp 3-22
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Summary
It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, focused on the logic of mental discourse rather than the metaphysical issue of how our mentality is related to our bodily nature. In fact, Ryle and Wittgenstein would have regarded, each for different reasons, the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation as arising out of deplorable linguistic confusions and not amenable to intelligible discussion. There was C. D. Broad's earlier and much neglected classic, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, which appeared in 1925, but this work, although robustly metaphysical, failed to connect with, and shape, the mind–body debate in the second half of this century. It is fair to say that the mind–body problem as we know it today had its proximate origins in a trio of papers published in the late 1950s: U. T. Place's ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, in 1956, and J. J. C. Smart's ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ and Herbert Feigl's ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’, published in 1958 and 1959 respectively.
The Mind–Body Problem after Fifty Years
- Jaegwon Kim
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- Journal:
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements / Volume 43 / March 1998
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 08 January 2010, pp. 3-21
- Print publication:
- March 1998
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It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, focused on the logic of mental discourse rather than the metaphysical issue of how our mentality is related to our bodily nature. In fact, Ryle and Wittgenstein would have regarded, each for different reasons, the metaphysical problem of the mind-body relation as arising out of deplorable linguistic confusions and not amenable to intelligible discussion. There was C. D. Broad's earlier and much neglected classic, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, which appeared in 1925, but this work, although robustly metaphysical, failed to connect with, and shape, the mind–body debate in the second half of this century.
15 - Dretske on how reasons explain behavior
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993, pp 285-308
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Summary
In a series of papers and a recent book, Fred Dretske has been working out an innovative account of how reasons explain behavior. His starting point is what we may call “the causal thesis”, often associated with Davidson, that reasons rationalize behavior by being its cause. With Davidson, therefore, Dretske takes rationalizing explanations to be a species of causal explanation, explanations that specify the causal antecedents of their explananda. Reasons are beliefs, desires, and other assorted “contentbearing” states, and these are among the paradigmatic instances of intentional mental states. Thus, the problem of explaining how reasons rationalize (that is, explain by providing reasons) is, for Dretske, the problem of giving an account of how intentional states can be causes, that is, the problem of intentional or rational causation. If we further assume, with Dretske, that the behavior to be rationalized is, or often involves, bodily events and processes, our problem is seen as a special case of the problem of psychophysical causation, that of understanding how mental events or states can enter into causal relations with physical events, as their causes or their effects. There is of course an even broader problem of mental causation, the problem of explaining how mental events can enter into any sort of causal relation, either as causes or as effects, whether with physical events or with other mental events.
The reality of the mental is closely tied to the possibility of mental causation, and anyone who takes a realist attitude toward the mental must be prepared with an account of how mental causation is possible.
6 - Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993, pp 92-108
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Summary
EPIPHENOMENAL CAUSATION
Jonathan Edwards held the doctrine that ordinary material things do not persist through time but are at each moment created, and recreated, by God ex nihilo. He writes:
If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect, and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method.
Thus, the present “time slice” of this table, although it is very much like the one preceding it, has no causal connection with it; for each slice is a wholly distinct creation by God. The temporal parts of this table are successive effects of an underlying persisting cause, God's creative activity. In arguing for this doctrine, Edwards offers the following striking analogy:
The images of things in a glass, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing, perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know that these images are constantly renewed, by the impression and reflection of new rays of light; so that the image impressed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image impressed by new rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye … And the new images being put on immediately or instantly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission of an hour or a day. […]
10 - Psychophysical supervenience
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993, pp 175-193
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Summary
Suppose we could create an exact physical replica of a living human being - exactly like him cell for cell, molecule for molecule, atom for atom. Such a replica would be indistinguishable, at least physically, from the original. For we are supposing that the replica is a perfect physical copy in every detail. The idea of such a replica, whether artificially created or naturally found, is a perfectly coherent one; in fact, it is consistent with all known laws of nature. The idea of course is a commonplace in science fiction.
Given that your replica and you are exactly alike physically, will you also share your psychological life with him? Will your replica have your psychological traits and dispositions, intellectual powers and artistic gifts, anxieties and depressions, likes and dislikes, and virtues and vices? Will it feel pain, remorse, joy and elation exactly in the way you do? That is, if two organisms have identical physical features, will they be identical in psychological characteristics as well?
According to many moral theorists, any two things sharing the same ‘naturalistic’ or ‘descriptive’ features cannot differ in respect of moral or evaluative properties. Thus, it has been said that if St. Francis is a good man, anyone who is just like him in all naturalistic respects - in this case, broadly psychological properties, such as traits of character and personality - must of necessity be a good man.
Sources
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993, pp xvii-xviii
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13 - Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993, pp 237-264
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Summary
I want to reopen the question whether the same bit of behavior, say an action we perform such as climbing a ladder, can be given both a “mechanistic” explanation, in terms of physiological processes and laws, and a “purposive” explanation, in terms of “reasons” (e.g., goals and beliefs). In a paper published in 1968, Norman Malcolm defended a negative answer. He argued that once an action has been explained by setting forth its physiological causal antecedents it is no longer open to us to explain it by citing the agent's reasons, that is, his beliefs, desires, intentions, and the like. Alvin Goldman immediately replied to Malcolm, arguing that mechanistic and purposive explanations are indeed compatible, that we can in fact characterize a type of situation in which one and the same behavior can be seen to be explainable both physiologically and rationally.
I want to reopen this debate not only because there is more to be said on this issue but also, and more importantly, because the issue has significant implications for some problems of much current interest in the philosophy of mind. A proper appreciation of the broader methodological issues and options involved will, I believe, help us to get clearer about some matters of current controversy. As we shall see, the question of explanatory compatibility leads us to more general questions about the pos-sibility of multiple explanations of a single explanandum, and the relationship between two distinct explanatory theories covering overlapping domains of phenomena.
9 - Postscripts on supervenience
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
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- 28 January 2010
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- 26 November 1993, pp 161-172
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Summary
RELATIONAL SUPERVENIENCE
Asked how badly he wanted to win the Super Bowl Washington Redskin left guard Russ Grimm replied, “I'd run over my mother to win it.” The quote was repeated to Los Angeles Raider inside linebacker Matt Millen, who answered, “I'd run over her, too, - I mean Grimm's mother.”
Sports Illustrated, January 30, 1984Accounts of supervenience to date have almost exclusively focused on properties (that is, monadic attributes), although relations are informally mentioned sometimes in connection with supervenience. What happens if relations are explicitly taken into consideration in characterizing supervenience?
Let A be the supervening set of attributes, and B the base set. Consider first the case in which A includes an n-adic relation R, but B includes only monadic properties. It is evident that for R to supervene on B, the following condition is necessary and sufficient:
For any n-tuples, (x1,..., xn) and (y1,..., yn) (to be abbreviated as Xn and Yn respectively), if they are indiscernible in set B, then R(Xn) iff R(Yn)
Depending on whether the n-tuples compared are restricted to a single world or may berecruited from different worlds, this will yield either “weak” or “strong” supervenience (Essay 5). But what is it for two n-tuples,Xn and Yn, to be indiscernible from eachother with respect to B? Since B is assumed to include only properties and norelations, the answer is simple: Xn is indiscernible fromYn in B just in case for each i (1' i' n) xiis indiscernible from yiin respect of B-properties.
Preface
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Supervenience and Mind
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- 28 January 2010
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- 26 November 1993, pp ix-xvi
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Summary
The essays selected for this volume have been written over a period of approximately twenty years since the early 1970s, and are reprinted here without changes except for typographical and minor stylistic corrections and the updating of footnotes. Part I consists of papers on the metaphysical issues of events, causation, and supervenience; Part II includes papers on issues in the metaphysics of mind - in particular, mind-body supervenience and mental causation. Each part ends with a set of postscripts indicating my current thoughts on some of the central problems discussed therein.
I wish I could say that I stand by everything I said in these papers; on some issues I do of course, but on others my views have changed, rather significantly in a few instances, and I expect them to continue to change and evolve. On some of the issues I am not even clear just what I am now prepared to defend. This is the case, for example, with the theory of events. In Essays 1 and 3, I formulated and argued for what is now standardly called the “property exemplification” account of events, and I still think that it is a viable approach. However, I am now inclined to think that ontological schemes are by and large optional, and that the main considerations that should govern the choice of an ontology are those of utility, simplicity, elegance, and the like.
16 - Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Supervenience and Mind
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- 28 January 2010
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- 26 November 1993, pp 309-335
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INTRODUCTION
It is part of today's conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind that psychological states are “multiply realizable”, and are in fact so realized, in a variety of structures and organisms. We are constantly reminded that any mental state, say pain, is capable of “realization”, “instantiation”, or “implementation” in widely diverse neural-biological structures in humans, felines, reptiles, mollusks, and perhaps other organisms further removed from us. Sometimes we are asked to contemplate the possibility that extraterrestrial creatures with a biochemistry radically different from the earthlings', or even electro-mechanical devices, can “realize the same psychology” that characterizes humans. This claim, to be called hereafter ‘the Multiple Realization Thesis’ (“MR”, for short), is widely accepted by philosophers, especially those who are inclined to favor the functionalist line on mentality. I will not here dispute the truth of MR, although what I will say may prompt a reassessment of the considerations that have led to its nearly universal acceptance.
And there is an influential and virtually uncontested view about the philosophical significance of MR. This is the belief that MR refutes psychophysical reductionism once and for all. In particular, the classic psychoneural identity theory of Feigl and Smart, the so-called “type physicalism”, is standardly thought to have been definitively dispatched by MR to the heap of obsolete philosophical theories of mind. At any rate, it is this claim, that MR proves the physical irreducibility of the mental, that will be the starting point of my discussion.
Frontmatter
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Book:
- Supervenience and Mind
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- 28 January 2010
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- 26 November 1993, pp i-vi
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Supervenience and Mind
- Selected Philosophical Essays
- Jaegwon Kim
- General editor Ernest Sosa
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- Published online:
- 28 January 2010
- Print publication:
- 26 November 1993
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Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticises the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection.